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ABSTRACT 
Previous research on social dilemmas demonstrated that 
various forms of punishment for free-riding can 
increase contribution levels in public goods games. The 
way individual group members react to the possibility 
of punishment can be also affected by individual 
differences in punishment sensitivity. Therefore, 
depending individual differences in punishment 
sensitivity of group members, different levels of 
punishment can be more or less effective to prevent free 
riding behaviour. This paper uses agent-based 
modelling to model the effect of punishment sensitivity 
on contribution levels in a public goods game. The 
paper then examines the correlation between 
punishment sensitivity and variability of free riding 
behaviour under different punishment conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public Goods (PG) game is a standard experimental 
economics approach to study human cooperation. In 
this game each player faces a dilemma: to invest into 
PG and potentially get a higher return through 
cooperation in the future; or keep their endowment 
which essentially means free riding on other people’s 
contributions. A standard finding using this paradigm is 
that there is variability in behaviour: some individuals 
cooperate while others free-ride (Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Fischbacher et al. 2001). Since cooperation is a 
fundamental feature of human society, it is important to 
understand why people choose to free-ride, and what 
factors can decrease levels of free-riding. One 
mechanism to promote cooperation is monetary 
punishment for free riding. Previous research 
demonstrated that the way people are affected by the 
punishment in the PG game differs between individuals 
and the differences are explained by trait punishment 
sensitivity (Skatova & Ferguson 2013). In their 
experiment, participants played a series of standard PG 
game with varying punishment conditions. Individual 
punishment sensitivity of participants was assessed 
through Behavioural Inhibition Scale (BIS, Carver & 
White 1994). The results demonstrated that participants 
contribute more under threats of punishment compared 
to no threat of punishment, and that people with higher 
punishment sensitivity provide higher contributions 
(free ride less) even when punishment is not certain. 
This research suggests that varying probability of 
punishment could affect contribution levels of groups 
depending on individuals’ levels of punishment 
sensitivity. However, the lab-based design of 
experiment with real participants limits opportunities to 
test how different levels of punishment threat in 
combination with different levels of sensitivity to 
punishment of group members, affects contribution 
levels of different groups. Current paper aims to fill this 
gap by modelling an experimental game using agent-
based modelling and simulation. This will allow to 
capture group dynamic through varying parameters of 
punishment and sensitivity to punishment in a series of 
artificial experiments.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Public Goods Game and Punishment 
In experimental economic, a laboratory PG experiment 
consists many participants, which are matched into 
groups (usually of four people). They will have an 
endowment of Money Unit (MUs) which they can keep 
for themselves or invest into a public account. The 
invested money is multiplied and distributed equally to 
all group members. This creates a dilemma: by 
investing something into PG, the player loses this 
money from their private account but potentially gains 
from future profits from public account. However, if the 
player contributed more than others, they will be worse 
off in the end, as the profits are distributed equally. 
Those who contribute less than there group members, 
therefore, free ride on the public good. Many researches 
attempted to explain the reason behind free-riding and 
how to maintain cooperation. One of the central 
mechanisms to sustain punishment in large groups is 
punishment. For example, Guillen et al. (2007) showed 
that central authority punishment increases the 
contribution comparing to the standard game. 
  
2.2. Agent-based Modelling and Simulation 
Agent-based Modelling and Simulation (ABMS) is a 
methodology that has been utilised recently by social 
scientists and economists to model social system. 
ABMS is individual-centric and decentralized approach, 
in which a system is modelled using fine-grained 
models with attention to dynamics. In economics, 
economies are complex dynamic systems, which are 
composed of many interacting units (individuals, 
organizations) and exhibit emergent properties. With 
ABMS, economic systems can be modelled from the 
bottom up, considering the global behaviours rooted in 
the local interactions (Tesfatsion 2006). 
Agent-based Modelling and Simulation is suitable to 
model the PG game experiment, because the experiment 
is a human-centric system and an agent represents a 
human very well. An agent, same as a human, is 
heterogeneous (with its own goals, behaviours), 
autonomous (can adapt and modify their behaviour), 
and proactive (adjust action depending on internal state) 
(Wooldridge & Jennings 1995). 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. The public goods game 
The simulated game will be in the same format as the 
experiment of Skatova & Ferguson (2013). The game 
comprised four blocks with punishment conditions in 
the following order: 
 
1. A non-punishment block (standard PG game) 
2. A implemented punishment block 
3. A non-implemented punishment block 
4. A non-punishment block 
 
Each block consisted of 10 trials (rounds). After each 
trial, participants were shuffled and put into group of 
four players they did not play before with. Each 
participant received the initial endowment of 20 MUs, 
which could be divided to the private and public 
account. After everyone made their investment decision, 
the payoff then calculated based on the following 
function: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 20 − 𝑔𝑖 + 0.5∑ 𝑔𝑗
4
𝑗=1     (1) 
 
Where a pay-off () for a participant i is defined by 
their contribution (g) and the sum of contributions of 
other players in the group. 
 
After the first block of a standard PG game, participants 
received additional instructions for the next three 
blocks, which introduced a punishment rule. In the non-
implemented punishment block, the punishment never 
occurred. In the implemented punishment block, the 
punishment actually occurred in two out of 10 trials. 
 
3.2. The agent-based model 
The agent-based model is implemented in AnyLogic 7, 
(XJ Technologies 2015), a multi-method simulation 
modelling tool. In the model, agents representing the 
participants played a series of one-shot PG games with 
three different conditions: non-punishment, 
implemented and non-implemented punishment. 
There were two types of agents: Main and Person. 
There was one Main agent, which acted as a game 
master, controled the game stage, and let Person agents 
know about the stage, and punishment condition of the 
game. There could be many Person agents, which 
represented the participants in the game. At the 
beginning of each game, each Person agent was 
assigned to a Group, which was implemented using a 
Java class. Group object managed the contribution and 
punishment of the group. 
The behaviour of agents was modelled using statechart. 
Statechart diagrams described different states of an 
agent and the transitions between them, and could be 
used to visualize and model the reaction of agents by 
internal or external factors. The use of statechart to 
model agent behaviour is described in the sections 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3. 
 
3.2.1. Strategies of Person agents 
For every Person, there was a variable: 
Punishment_Sensitivity, which represented punishment 
sensitivity value measured by BIS-anxiety score, a 
subscale of BIS (Skatova & Ferguson, 2013). 
Punishment_Sensitivity ranged from 1 to 4. Based on 
Skatova & Ferguson’s work, there were differences in 
behaviours of people with high and low punishment 
sensitivity. Accordingly, we categorized Person agents 
based on its Punishment_Sensitivity variable. The agent 
were categorized as “high-anxiety” if 
Punishment_Sensitivity of a Person agent was greater 
than 3.13. Person agents with Punishment_Sensitivity 
less than 3.13 were “low-anxiety”. People with different 
anxiety had the tendency to use different strategies. 
There were five available strategies for Person agents: 
 
1. Full Cooperation (FC): always contributed 20 
MUs. 
2. Strong Conditional Cooperation (SCC): 
contributed 3-4 MUs more than average group 
investment in previous round. 
3. Normal Conditional Cooperation (NCC): 
contributed the same or difference of 1 MU 
with average group investment in previous 
round. 
4. Weak Conditional Cooperation (WCC): 
contributed 3-4 MUs less than average group 
investment in previous round. 
5. Full Defection (FD): always contributed 0 
MU. 
 High-anxiety agents tended to contribute more; while 
low-anxiety agents tended to contribute less. Therefore, 
at the beginning, each Person agent was assigned with a 
strategy and a Punishment_Sensitivity value following 
the distribution in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Person agent initialization 
Percentage 
of agents 
Strategy Anxiety 
5% FC 100% High 
20% SCC 80% High, 
20% Low 
50% NCC 50% High, 
50% Low 
15% WCC 20% High, 
80% Low 
10% FD 100% Low 
 
3.2.2. Modelling game play 
The Main agent and Person agents used two statecharts 
(Figure 1) to coordinate and play the game. The game 
had several stages such as invest, payoff, punish. Each 
stage of the game was represented by a state in 
statechart of the Main agent. Based on the current state 
of the statechart, the Main agent sent messages to all 
Person agents to inform the current stage of the game. 
Based on the received message, the Person agents also 
made transition to the corresponding state. 
 
Figure 1: Gameplay statecharts of Main agent and 
Person agent 
 
At the beginning, when in “Ready” state, the Main 
agent prepared for the game by setting up variables, 
shuffling Person agents, and assigning them to groups. 
Then the Main agent changed state to “Invest”, in which 
messages were sent to all Person agents. Person agents 
were in “Idle” state would change to “Invest” state 
when they received the message, and made a decision 
on how much to invest based on their strategy. After all 
Person agents made investment decision, the Main 
agent went to “Payoff” state and sent messages to all 
Person agents. The Person agents changed to 
“ReceivePayoff” and asked the Group object to 
calculate the payoff and the average investment of the 
group. After receiving payoff, Person agents went to 
“Idle” state. In the Main agents, if punishment was 
implemented during that game round, Person agents 
went to “Punish” state, and sent messages to Person 
agents. There was a self-transition in “Idle” state of 
Person agents, which was triggered when they received 
message about punishment. When triggered, Person 
agents asked Group object whether they got punished. If 
punishment was not implemented, Main agent changed 
state from “Payoff” to “CollectData”, and then went 
back to “Ready” state. 
 
3.2.3. Modelling individual differences in 
punishment sensitivity  
A representation of Punishment Sensitivity was 
implemented in each Person agent to represent 
individual differences related to BIS-anxiety value. 
People with higher punishment sensitivity would be 
more cautious and avoid free-riding behaviour in 
response to signals of punishment. In addition, people 
were only cautious for a period of time and then they 
forget about punihsment. Therefore, the agents were 
contributing more when there was threat of punishment, 
and only being cautious for several rounds after. The 
behaviours were modelled with a statechart (Figure 2), 
which had two states: “Normal” and “Cautious”. The 
state change was controlled by two transitions: 
 
 From “Normal” to “Cautious”: This transition 
was triggered if (the agent was high-anxiety 
AND there was threat of punishment AND the 
agent had not been in cautious state) OR (the 
agent got punished). 
 From “Cautious” to “Normal”: This transition 
was triggered if (there was no threat of 
punishment) OR (a low-anxiety agent had been 
in “Cautious” state for 3 rounds) OR (a high-
anxiety agent had been in “Cautious” state for 
10 rounds). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Punishment Sensitivity statechart of Person 
agent 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Main agent (b) Person agent 
Table 2: Strategy change of Conditional Cooperators 
High Anxiety 
Normal to 
Cautious 
SCC NCC WCC0.2 0.8
0.8
0.2
 
Cautious to 
Normal 
SCC NCC WCC0.2 0.2
0.8 0.8
 
Low Anxiety 
Normal to 
Cautious 
SCC NCC WCC1 1
 
Cautious to 
Normal 
SCC NCC WCC0.8 0.8
0.2
0.2
 
 
When a Person agent changed state, the strategy of that 
agent would also be changed as well. The high-anxiety 
agent using FC strategy did not change strategy. The 
low-anxiety agent using FD strategy would change to 
WCC strategy when changing to “Cautious” state, and 
change back to FD strategy when changing to “Normal” 
state. For the agent who was using conditional 
cooperation strategies (SCC, NCC and WCC), the 
strategy change followed as described in the Table 2. 
When changing to “Cautious” state, agents would avoid 
free riding and stop using WCC strategy. Because 
agents with high anxiety contribute more under threat of 
punishment, when agents changed to “Cautious” state, 
high-anxiety agents were more likely to change to SCC 
than low-anxiety ones. For example, in the first graph of 
Table 2, 80% of high-anxiety agents using WCC 
strategy changed to NCC strategy, and the rest (20%) 
changed to SCC strategy. When agents changed to the 
“Normal” state, low-anxiety agents were more likely to 
use WCC strategy than the high-anxiety ones. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Validation Experiment 
In this experiment, the model was set up with the 
similar settings to Skatova & Ferguson (2013) to 
validate the simulation results and examine whether the 
model replicates the contribution level over different 
blocks as well as the correlation between punishment 
sensitivity and free riding behaviour of a real 
experiment. The simulation was set up with 1000 
Person agents, initialized with different punishment 
sensitivity value and strategy based on Table 1. Person 
agents played four blocks (10 trials each block): 
 
1. A non-punishment block 
2. A implemented punishment block 
3. A non-implemented punishment block 
4. A non-punishment block 
 
 
Figure 3: Average investment over four blocks 
 
 
Figure 4: Average investment over 40 trials 
 
Only the Main agent knew about the punishment 
conditions of the blocks. The Main agent just informed 
Person agents that there would be a threat of 
punishment in the second and third block. In the 
implemented punishment block, punishment was 
implemented in two out of ten trials. 
The average group investments over four blocks, 
showed in Figure 3, replicated the trend in Skatova & 
Ferguson laboratory experiment. The average 
investment in the first block of standard PGG was 8.25. 
In the second block where punishment was 
implemented in two out of ten trials, the group 
investment increased to 9.77. In the third block where 
the punishment was expected but not implemented, the 
group investment decreased to 8.64. In the last block of 
standard PGG, the group investment dropped to 7.34. 
In the second block of this particular experiment, the 
punishment was implemented at block 12 and 14. 
Figure 4 shows that the average investment had a sharp 
rise after block 12 and 14. In those two trials, it 
appeared that free-riding agents, especially low-anxiety 
agents, got punished, switched to more cooperative 
strategies, and contributed more in the next ground. If 
this was a lab experiment, we would not be able to 
investigate much further. But since we used an agent-
based model, we could analyse the decision making 
process of agents better.  
Figure 5 shows the states of punishment sensitivity 
statechart of all agents. In the first 10 rounds, all agents 
were in “Normal” state. When there was a threat of 
punishment, high-anxiety agents changed to “Cautious” 
state. In block 12 and 14, when the punishment was 
implemented, free-riding agents got punished and 
changed to “Cautious” state. The more agents were in 
“Cautions” state, the more contribution there was 
overall. The strategy change of conditional cooperators, 
who were the majority, played a crucial role to the 
contribution in the system. Figure 6 and 7 shows the 
strategy change of high and low anxiety agents. High-
anxiety agents changed to more cooperative strategy 
when there was a threat of punishment then changed the 
strategy again after being cautious for 10 rounds. Low-
anxiety agents still used the same strategy even when 
there was a threat of punishment. They only changed 
when punishment was implemented (trial 12 and 14): 
the more agents used SCC, the less agents used WCC. 
After 3 rounds of being cautious, low-anxiety agents 
changed back to Normal state, and used less cooperative 
strategies.  
 
Figure 5: Agent states of punishment sensitivity 
statechart 
 
 
Figure 6: Strategy of high-anxiety agents 
 
 
Figure 7: Strategy of low-anxiety agents 
4.2. Experiments with different Punishment 
Conditions 
One of the applications of this model is to use it for 
examination of the contribution levels under different 
levels of punishment. In this experiment, the model was 
set up with the same ratio of agents but under different 
punishment conditions. We then analysed the 
simulation results to understand more about free-riding 
behaviours in various punishment conditions. 
Figure 8 shows an experiment where in every trial 
punishment was expected but only implemented 
periodically. If the punishment was implemented every 
trial, the contribution level increased gradually before 
stabilizing. The same trend occurred for implemented 
punishment every 3 trials, but the contribution level was 
lower. If the punishment was implemented every 5, 10 
or 15 trials, the contribution levels oscillate, which 
meant contributions decreased over time and only 
increased in trials with implemented punishment. The 
greater the period between two implemented 
punishment trials, the lower was the contribution level. 
Figure 9 and 10 show another experiment in which 
agents played in a series of non-punishment blocks of 
PG games, and the implemented punishment blocks 
occurred periodically. In the implemented punishment 
blocks of Figure 9, randomly on two out of ten trials 
individuals were punished. While in Figure 10, 
randomly on five out of ten trials punishment was 
implemented. The contribution level decreased and for 
certain number of trials became stable, to only increase 
when punishment was implemented. Comparing 
between Figure 9 and 10, the contribution level (overall 
as well as the peaks) was higher in Figure 10. This was 
because there were more trials where punishment was 
implemented in Figure 10 than in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 8: Punishment was periodically implemented on 
trials in an expected punishment condition 
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Figure 9: Punishment was periodically implemented in 
a block with two out of ten punishment games per block 
 
 
Figure 10: Punishment was periodically implemented in 
a block with five out of ten punishment games per block 
 
The above experiments showed that contribution levels 
had different dynamic in different punishment 
conditions. Using the agent-based models as a decision 
support tools, policy maker could be able to decide on 
how to implement punishment in order to achieve a 
desired pattern of contributions in the real world public 
good scenario. 
 
4.3. Experiments with different ratios of strategy 
In this experiments, we investigated how the ratios of 
strategy used by agents are affected the total investment 
of four blocks. Figure 11 shows the results of six 
experiments. The total percentages of five strategies 
(FD, SCC, NCC, WCC, FD) were 100%. In all the 
experiments, the percentage of FC was fixed to 5%. 
There were three experiments with 10% of FD (solid 
line), and three experiments with 30% of FD (dotted 
line). So in each experiment, the percentages of FC, FD, 
and SCC were fixed, then percentage of NCC was 
varied from 0% to 100%, and the rest would be 
percentage of WCC. The percentage of NCC was 
represented by the x-axis, while the total invesment was 
represented by the y-axis. For example, the red solid 
line had 5% FC, 10% FD, 20% SCC; and as the 
percentage of NCC increased, the total investment 
increased as well. 
 
How the ratios of strategy affect the total investment 
can be concluded by comparing between these 
experiments: 
 Looking at one experiment, we noted the larger 
the percentage of NCC was, the more 
investment there was into PG. 
 Comparing between the blue, red, green line, 
we saw that the larger the percentage of SCC 
was, the more investment there was into PG. 
 Lastly, comparing between the solid line (FD 
10%) and dotted line (FD 30%), the smaller 
the percentage FD was, the more investment 
there was into PG. 
 With FD of 10%, the increase in percengate of 
SCC (from 0% to 20% to 50%) resulted in 
bigger raise of total invesment comparing with 
FD of 30%. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Total investment in different ratios of 
strategy 
 
 
Table 3: Experiments with different ratios of anxiety 
Strategy Anxiety 
Exp. 1 
(baseline) 
Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
FC 100% High 100% High 100% High 
SCC 80% High, 
20% Low 
80% High, 
20% Low 
20% High, 
80% Low 
NCC 50% High, 
50% Low 
80% High, 
20% Low 
20% High, 
80% Low 
WCC 20% High, 
80% Low 
80% High, 
20% Low 
20% High, 
80% Low 
FD 100% Low 100% Low 100% Low 
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Figure 12: Investment over time in different ratios of 
anxiety 
 
4.4. Experiments with different ratios of anxiety 
The final experiments were to change the ratios of 
anxiety and examined the investment over time. Using 
the experiment in section 4.1 as the baseline, two more 
experiments were set up by changing the ratios of high 
and low anxiety of conditional cooperators (CSS, NCC, 
WCC). In the second experiment, 80% of conditional 
cooperators were high anxiety and 20% were low 
anxiety. In the third experiment, 20% of conditional 
cooperators were high anxiety and 80% were low 
anxiety. Table 3 shows the three experiments and 
corresponding percentages of anxiety levels. 
The results of three experiments are shown in Figure 12. 
In the first block (first 10 trails) the investment trend 
was the same for the three experiments. This is because 
the investment in the standard PG game is only affected 
by the ratio of strategies used by agents, not by their 
anxiety. 
For the last three blocks: 
 In the second experiment, because there were 
more high-anxiety agents, the investment was 
increasing faster than the first experiment, and 
became stable at higher value. 
 In the third experiment, because there were 
more low-anxiety agents, the investment was 
increasing to approximate the same value of 
the first experiment, but became stable at lower 
value. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Using agent-based modelling and simulation, this paper 
has modelled the effects of individual differences in 
punishment sensitivity in a Public Good Game. The 
simulation has validated the behaviours which observed 
in Skatova & Ferguson laboratory experiment. This 
agent-based model can be used as a decision support 
tool for policy makers to examine the free riding 
behaviours in varying punishment conditions in a real 
world scenario which resembles a public goods game 
(e.g., recycling, littering, energy use at home, etc). 
This paper also demonstrated that agent-based 
modelling and simulation can be used to investigate 
different aspects of human decision-making which do 
not integrate with traditional economic models of 
behaviour. Researchers have been trying to extend the 
traditional approach by integrating other sciences (such 
as psychology and neuroscience) to add more layers 
into human decision-making models. Theoretical 
models can be validated by using the approach 
developed in this paper. Modeller can build an agent-
based model in which the overall decision making 
process of agent is affected by the combination of many 
decision-making factors derived from models in 
different disciplines. 
In future research, classification techniques can be used 
for analysing the change in the strategy of participants 
in the laboratory experiment with different punishment 
conditions, and developing a method to capture the 
change in contribution levels.  It is also interesting to 
collect more data on the interaction between strategies 
and anxiety of people from different demographic 
groups. 
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